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LET US NEVER BLAME A CONTRACT
BREAKER
Richard A. Posner*
Holmes famously proposed a "no fault" theory of contract law: a
contract is an option to perform or pay, and a "breach" is therefore
not a wrongful act, but merely triggers the duty to pay liquidated or
other damages. I elaborate the Holmesian theory, arguing that fault
terminology in contract law, such as "good faith," should be given
pragmatic economic interpretations, rather than be conceived of in
moral terms. I further argue that contract doctrines should nor-
mally be alterable only on the basis of empirical investigations.
1.
My thesis is that concepts of fault or blame, at least when understood in
moral terms rather than translated into economic or other practical terms,
are not useful addenda to the doctrines of contract law. I have borrowed this
thesis from Holmes, who in The Common Law (and later in The Path of the
Law) drew a sharp distinction between tort and contract law, so far as issues
of fault or blameworthiness are concerned.' In the case of an accident giving
rise to a tort suit, he thought the loss should lie where it fell, that is, on the
victim, unless the injurer was at fault, that is, negligent, and the victim fault-
less, that is, not contributorily negligent. He thus disapproved, in general, of
strict tort liability. But a complication in his analysis arose from his belief in
"objective" standards of liability; negligence was the failure of the average
person to take proper care, even if the defendant was below average in his
ability to do so.' That belief was not a fatal defect in Holmes's fault-based
theory of tort law, however; as Bernard Williams has reminded us, conse-
quences, and not just states of mind, influence our moral judgments. "[I]n
the story of one's life there is an authority exercised by what one has done,
and not merely by what one has intentionally done."3 So inability to meet
society's expectations concerning care to avoid inflicting injury can, when
injury results, be considered a species of fault.
* Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University of
Chicago Law School. I thank Mark Sayson and Michael Thorpe for helpful research assistance.
1. O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 107-10, 299-301 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co.
1881) [hereinafter HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW]; O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L.
REv. 457, 462 (1897) [hereinafter Holmes, The Path of the Law].
2. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 1, at 108-10.
3. BERNARD WILLIAMS, SHAME AND NECESSITY 69 (1993); see also BERNARD WILLIAMS,




But Holmes was wrong to think that the pockets of strict liability in tort
law were inconsistent with a fault-based theory of that law. Strict liability is
based on recognition that care is too limited a notion of the duty to avoid
doing harm. If you keep a lion in your backyard to ward off intruders and he
escapes and mauls someone even though you took every precaution to
minimize the risk of escape, there is still the question whether the expected
costs of keeping a lion (the risk of injury discounted by the cost of the injury
if the risk materializes) exceeded the benefits. To classify an activity as
"abnormally dangerous," thus making the applicable tort standard strict li-
ability, is to adjudge those costs to exceed the benefits.
Holmes's theory of contract law is as fault free as his theory of tort law
is fault saturated. He thought of contracts as options-when you sign a con-
tract in which you promise a specified performance (supplying a product, or
providing a service) you buy an option to perform or pay damages.4 The
option feature is particularly pronounced when the contract contains a liqui-
dated damages clause. You are promising that you will either perform or pay
the amount specified in the clause. As long as you pay the damages awarded
by the court in the promisee's suit for breach of contract, whether they are
specified in the clause or computed according to the principles of contract
damages, no blame can attach to your not performing even if it was deliber-
ate--even if, for example, you did not perform simply because someone
offered you more money for the product or service that you had undertaken
to supply in the contract and you did not have enough capacity to supply
both the promisee and the new, more necessitous customer You have not
really broken your promise, because what you promised (though that is not
how the contract will have been worded) was either-or: not performance but
either performance or compensation for the cost of nonperformance to the
other party to the contract.
The fact that the victim of a breach of contract can sometimes obtain
specific performance or some other form of injunctive relief might seem a
great embarrassment to Holmes's option theory of contract. But it is not if
we bear in mind that injunctive relief is possible only when the remedy at
law-that is, damages-is unavailable. For in such a case the contractual
undertaking loses its either-or character; instead of a promise of perform-
ance or damages, it is a promise of performance or nothing, and that is not a
choice the promisee would have agreed to. In contrast, a general entitlement
to specific performance would indeed make contract law fault based. A
court would not be willing to command a nonperforming party to perform,
on pain of civil and criminal contempt and potentially astronomical fines if
he did not, without considering whether he was in some sense "at fault" in
not performing-whether in other words the costs to him of performing
would have exceeded the benefits to the other party. Moreover, a general
4. Holmes, The Path of the Law, supra note 1, at 462.
5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS ch. 16, introductory note (1981); id. § 309.
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6entitlement to specific performance would thwart some efficient breaches.
If A breaks his contract with B to sell to C because C will pay more than the
harm (which equals damages) to B from the breach, the breach increases the
social product: B is no worse off, and A and C are both better off. But if B is
entitled to specific performance, A cannot sell to C without paying B to
agree to terminate A's contract with him, creating a bilateral-monopoly
situation (of which more shortly).
The option theory of contract also implies that liability for the breach of
a contract is strict, that is, that the victim of the breach need not prove fault
by the contract breaker (another reason why specific performance can't be
the standard remedy for breach). The promise is to perform or pay damages,
and so if you choose not to perform--even if you are prevented from per-
forming by circumstances beyond your control-you must pay damages. It
wouldn't make any sense to excuse you just because the cost of performance
would exceed the benefits, for that would make the option nugatory.
Another way to understand this point is to note that an option has an in-
surance component. If you promise me either performance or some
compensation in lieu of performance you are insuring me against the conse-
quences of your nonperformance. As Holmes explained with characteristic
directness,
[t]he consequences of a binding promise at common law are not affected
by the degree of power which the promisor possesses over the promised
event .... In the case of a binding promise that it shall rain to-morrow, the
immediate legal effect of what the promisor does is, that he takes the risk
of the event, within certain defined limits, as between himself and the
promisee. He does no more when he promises to deliver a bale of cotton.
You will make such a promise-grant me such an option-if you are the
cheaper insurer against the risk of nonperformance. Strict liability for non-
performance reduces transaction costs by optimizing risk bearing (the
function performed in the tort setting by formal liability insurance).
The civil law approach to breach of contract is different from the com-
mon law approach. Liability is not strict; a party is in breach of his contract
only if he "could reasonably have been expected to behave in a different
way," that is, only if he was at fault in failing to perform.' And the victim's
entitlement (to the extent actually honored) under civil law to specific per-
formance discourages efficient breaches.9 The duty of good faith-the
6. Ronald J. Scalise Jr., Why No "Efficient Breach" in the Civil Law?: A Comparative
Assessment of the Doctrine of Efficient Breach of Contract, 55 Am. J. CoMP. L. 721, 726-27, 763
(2007).
7. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 1, at 299-300.
8. Jirgen Basedow, Towards a Universal Doctrine of Breach of Contract: The Impact of the
CISG, 25 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 487, 496 (2005) ("[T]he fault principle is often considered to be
an indispensable part of the law of obligations in civil law countries."); see also John Y. Gotanda,
Recovering Lost Profits in International Disputes, 36 GEO. J. IN''L L. 61, 76 (2004). But the practi-
cal significance of the doctrinal differences between common law and civil law contract law has
been questioned, as I note later.
9. Scalise, supra note 6, at 726-27.
June 20091
Michigan Law Review
common law version of which can, as we shall see, be explained in non-
moral terms-in civil law expands to include "[b]ad faith bargaining,"
which may not have a pragmatic, nonmoral, justification.
The difference between the common law and civil law conceptions of
contract law may be due to the fact that the common law of contracts
evolved from the law merchant and the civil law of contracts from canon
law." It is apparent which origin is more likely to produce efficient law.
There is evidence that common law is indeed superior to civil law from the
standpoint of promoting commercial activity.12
One might object to the common law rule of strict liability for breach of
contract that a contracting party, at least if it is a corporation, either will be
risk averse (because its shareholders can eliminate firm-specific risk by
holding a diversified portfolio of stocks) or can buy insurance from an in-
surance company, and so it can have no need for an insurance component in
its contracts. But even large corporations often buy a great deal of insurance;
the reasons have to do with managerial risk aversion (a large part of a man-
ager's wealth may be his firm-specific human capital), tax avoidance, and
the deadweight costs of bankruptcy. 3 It is difficult, however, to buy market
insurance against the risk of being the victim of a breach of contract, be-
cause the risk and its consequences cannot be calculated with the actuarial
precision that insurance companies insist upon;"4 there is too much hetero-
geneity among contracts-too much uncertainty about the likelihood and
consequences of a breach. The difficulty of insuring against breach of con-
tract has been demonstrated in the current financial crisis by the near
collapse of American Insurance Group (saved only by a federal bailout),
which through credit default swaps and other devices had offered default
insurance on a large scale.
Probing deeper, we can see that strict liability for breach of contract, too,
is a sensible default provision, which allows the parties to specify excuses
10. William Tetley, Good Faith in Contract: Particularly in the Contracts ofArbitration and
Chartering, 35 J. MAR. L. & COM. 561, 568 (2004); cf P.D.V. MARSH, COMPARATIVE CONTRACT
LAW: ENGLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY 65 (1994).
11. Joseph M. Perillo, Essay, UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts:
The Black Letter Text and a Review, 63 FOROHAM L. REV. 281, 308 n. 190 (1994).
12. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1193,
1220-22 (2002); Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be
Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2001); Salvatore Mancuso, The New African Law: Beyond the Dif-
ference Between Common Law and Civil Law, 14 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMp. L. 39, 52 (2008);
Simeon Djankov et al., Debt Enforcement Around the World 24-25 (Eur. Corporate Governance
Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 147/2007, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstractid=953000.
Yet by not distinguishing between liquidated damages clauses and penalty clauses, the civil law
expands freedom of contract, although civil law judges do refuse to enforce "clearly unreasonable"
damages clauses. Ugo Mattei, The Comparative Law and Economics of Penalty Clauses in Con-
tracts, 43 AM. J. Comp'. L. 427, 442 (1995); accord id. at 441; Lucia Ostoni, Translation, Italian
Rejection of Punitive Damages in a U.S. Judgment, 24 J.L. & Com. 245, 261 (2005).
13. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 471 (7th ed. 2007).
14. Cf Alfred W. Cortese, Jr. & Kathleen L. Blaner, The Anti-Competitive Impact of U.S.
Product Liability Laws: Are Foreign Businesses Beating Us at Our Own Game?, 9 J.L. & COM. 167,
182 (1989).
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for failure to perform, such as force majeure. There are also default excuse
provisions, such as impossibility and frustration, but the justification is eco-
nomic rather than moral; they allocate risk as the parties could be expected
to have done had they negotiated over the issue."5
Then too, determination of fault would necessarily be based on matters
outside the contract itself, whereas it is highly desirable, in order to mini-
mize the expense and uncertainty of litigation, that most breach-of-contract
cases be decided by a simple comparison (made without a trial or even
pretrial discovery) of the language of the contract with the fact of nonper-
formance.
Eric Posner pointed out at the conference at which the papers in this
Symposium were first presented that negligence can be discussed in non-
fault terms, such as the antiseptic terms of the Hand Formula, and thus could
be proposed as a rival to strict liability in contract law without entry into the
morality thicket. But if I am right that contracts contain an important ele-
ment of insurance, and that strict liability for nonperformance also
facilitates contract negotiation and minimizes uncertainty, strict liability is a
more efficient regime for contract cases than negligence would be.
Strict liability for breach of contract is not logically inconsistent with
treating willful breaches differently from involuntary ones, as by awarding
punitive damages for the former but not the latter. But contract law does not
do that, and for good reasons. For what exactly is a "willful" breach? In the
usual case of breach of contract the cost of performance to the defendant
would exceed the benefit to the plaintiff. The cost might be or might include
an opportunity cost, as in my example in which the defendant discovered
that he could sell his product to a third party at a higher price than the con-
tract price. An opportunity cost is a real cost. To deem a breach motivated
by a desire to avoid such a cost "willful," and impose punitive damages or
order specific performance, would encourage inefficient conduct-
providing a product or service to a party (the contract promisee) who valued
it less than someone else did.
Of course the three parties involved might bargain their way out of the
situation. But that would be a costly bargaining because of the bilateral-
monopoly setting. The promisor could get out of the contract only by nego-
tiating with the promisee, and the promisee could extract concessions from
the promisor only by negotiating with him. Each party would be pushing to
maximize his share of the surplus value that the breach would enable, and
such a negotiation is costly and may fail. If it fails, the surplus is lost, and
that is a social and not merely a private cost.
There is an element of perversity, moreover, in arguing that efficient
breaches, being deliberate rather than compelled, should be discouraged.
Efficient breaches are efficient. Involuntary breaches are often inefficient:
the promisor miscalculated his ability to comply with the contractual terms
to which he had agreed. I am not suggesting that he should be "punished";
but if fault were taken seriously in contract law, he, like a negligent injurer
15. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 13, at 96-97.
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sued in tort, would be thought at fault whereas a party that committed an
efficient breach and thus increases the social product would not be.
The common law rule, consistent with the "no-fault" theory of contract
that I am defending as a sound positive as well as normative theory, is that
punitive damages are not recoverable in breach-of-contract cases.' 6 The ma-
jor judge-made exception is for breaches by liability insurance companies
of their contractual duty to defend.' Insureds, especially when they are indi-
viduals rather than firms (for example, a driver who has injured someone in
an automobile accident), often lack the knowledge or resources required to
obtain competent counsel. This may doom their defense to a tort suit and
even result in a judgment that takes liability for the injury inflicted on the
tort plaintiff out of the coverage of the insurance policy altogether. Yet proof
of damages in a suit against the insurance company for breach of its duty to
defend may be impossible, or at least very difficult, because it would require
a comparison of the performance of the insured's lawyer with the hypotheti-
cal performance of the hypothetical lawyer whom the insurance company
would have retained or paid for had it acknowledged its duty to defend. And
it would require a determination whether, even if a good lawyer would still
have lost the case, at least the court would not have made findings that viti-
ated the company's duty to indemnify.
The award of restitution in contract cases might be thought inconsistent
with the "no-fault" theory of contract that I am advocating. Restitution is
normally awarded when the law wants to deter the defendant's conduct
rather than just make him internalize its costs. In a copyright case, for ex-
ample, the infringer may be the more efficient exploiter of the copyrighted
work than the copyright owner, but, if so, limiting the latter to compensatory
damages would create a regime of compulsory licensing. Anyone who
thought himself the more efficient producer could infringe with impunity,
treating the damages that he would owe the copyright owner as a licensing
fee. Restitution of the infringer's profits, by making the infringement worth-
less to him, forces the would-be infringer to negotiate with the copyright
owner, thus preserving the property-rights regime of copyright law.
To award restitution in contract cases, however--other than in cases of
rescission, where the object is to return the parties to their precontractual
position, which may require one of the parties to give up a benefit it re-
ceived from the other (perhaps because of mistake, a common ground for
rescission), or in extraordinary situations in which for one reason or another
compensatory damages would not compensate the victim of the breach-
would create a property right in the enforcement of a contract; and that
would give rise to the bilateral-monopoly problem discussed earlier. The
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981).
17. Consumer-protection statutes, such as the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, frequently
provide for the award of statutory damages, which are similar to punitive damages. See, e.g., 15
U.S.C. § 1692k (2006).
18. See, e.g., 2 ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS & DISPUTES: REPRESENTATION OF
COMPANIES AND INSUREDS § 9:26 (5th ed. 2007).
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promisor who had a superior opportunity to that enabled by the contract
could not avail himself of it (more precisely, could obtain no profit from
seizing the opportunity) without a negotiation with the promisee. The prob-
lem is less acute in copyright cases, where often there are multiple potential
infringers, who if prevented from keeping profits from infringement will
instead compete to obtain a license from the copyright owner.
Consistent with the economics of the situation, the traditional rule was
that restitution was indeed not available simply to give the victim of a
breach of contract a choice between his loss and the other party's gain. The
traditional rule is under pressure, but it is too soon to determine whether it
will give way; there is very little case law on the question.' 9
Professors Thel and Siegelman, in their article in this Symposium, dis-
cuss what is in substance though not in name restitution as a remedy for•20
breach of contract: the award of windfall damages to middlemen. Suppose
A, a farmer, agrees to sell seeds to B, a seed wholesaler, for $100, and B
agrees to resell the seeds to C, a nursery, for $150. Before delivery is due the
price of seeds doubles, and A breaks his contract with B and sells the seeds
to D for the new market price of $200. If B is able to cover, and honor his
contract with C, he will incur a loss that he can charge to A. But suppose B's
contract with C contains a clause that allows B to terminate the contract
without liability. B does so, renegotiates the contract, and sells the seeds to
C at a price that yields B the same profit as the original contract would have
done. B has incurred no loss as a result of A's breach, yet most courts would
deem him entitled to obtain damages from A equal to the difference between
the market price ($200) and the price in his contract with A ($100). In effect,
he receives A's profit from the breach.
But this result is sound, because the breach has not produced an effi-
ciency gain; A is selling at the market price rather than to someone who
values the seeds more than B does. And B's inability to sell to his buyer, C,
at the agreed-upon price may damage his business relationship with C (and
perhaps with other customers as well).2 Moreover, if the market price of
seeds had fallen, B would have incurred an uncompensated loss by reason of
having had to buy them from A at the higher contract price, which would
limit B's ability to resell at a profit. Thus, what seem "windfall" damages to
B are really just the outcome of an agreed risk sharing. The expectation of a
"windfall" compensates B for the possibility that he will have to confer a
22"windfall" on A, depending on which direction the market price moves in.
19. See the illuminating discussion in Andrew Kull, Disgorgementfor Breach, the "Restitu-
tion Interest," and the Restatement of Contracts, 79 TEx. L. REv. 2021 (2001).
20. Steve Thel & Peter Siegelman, Wilfulness vs. Expectation: A Promisor-Based Defense of
Wilful Breach Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1517, 1521 (2009).
21. Id. (citing VICTOR GOLDBERG, FRAMING CONTRACT LAW 225 (2006)).
22. Cf Tongish v. Thomas, 840 P.2d 471, 476 (Kan. 1992).
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Thel and Siegelman suggest another case in which restitution may be an
efficient remedy for breach of contract.2' A building contract specifies a par-
ticular brand of pipe; the builder deliberately substitutes another brand,
which is just as good but cheaper, and so the builder saves money and yet
the buyer is no worse off. This looks like the efficient result, and one won-
ders therefore why the builder's conduct should be deemed a breach, let
alone a willful one requiring a sanction even though the "victim" of the
breach has incurred no loss. (Whether it should be deemed a breach with
zero damages or not a breach at all is of little consequence.) But as Thel and
Siegelman explain, the fact that the contract specified a particular brand may
have been intended to curtail the builder's discretion out of concern that any
deliberate substitution might well be inferior yet that this might be difficult
to prove. Another possibility is that the buyer wanted that brand for some
idiosyncratic reason, which a court could not value. In both situations, resti-
tution of the builder's profit from the substitution might be justified.2
I say "might" rather than "would" be justified because it can be argued
that building contracts are understood by the parties to give the builder lee-
way to make substitutions in response to changes in the price and
availability of the various components25 and that the buyer is compensated
for the builder's freedom by the lower price that the builder will charge in
exchange for obtaining such flexibility. The specifications in the contract
still are legally enforceable, so that the buyer has a remedy against a substi-
tution that whether or not approved by the architect (and there may not be
an architect) reduces the value of the property. But if there is no reduction in
value, no damages can be obtained.
My argument thus far may be criticized on the ground that compensa-
tory damages for breach of contract are often inadequate to deter inefficient
breaches. That is a common ground for wanting to carve out a class of "will-
ful" breaches and punish them in some fashion, for example by ordering
restitution of the contract breaker's profits. 26 But if a supposedly compensa-
tory remedy is not compensatory, then alter the remedy. Yet is that really
necessary? The parties are free to specify in advance (within reasonable lim-
its) the amount of damages to which the victim of a breach will be entitled.
I hope I will not be misunderstood to be arguing that there is never
wrongful conduct in the negotiation or performance of contracts. I wrote an
23. Thel & Siegelman, supra note 20, at 1526. The case is a variant of Jacob & Youngs, Inc.
v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921), but there the substitution was inadvertent, and the court said that
all the plaintiff would be entitled to was the reduction in the value of his property as a result of the
substitution-which was probably zero.
24. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LEGAL THEORY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 55-58
(1996).
25. See RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 106 (1990); Todd D.
Rakoff, Implied Terms: Of 'Default Rules' and 'Situation Sense,' in GooD FAITH AND FAULT IN
CONTRACT LAW 191, 209 (Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995).
26. See, e.g., George M. Cohen, The Fault Lines in Contract Damages, 80 VA. L. REv. 1225
(1994).
1356 [Vol. 107:1349
Let Us Never Blame a Contract Breaker
opinion recently that presented an interesting example of such conduct. 7
Here is a simplified version. A and B make a written contract. Later A sues B
claiming that during the negotiations B deliberately misrepresented the
benefits that A would derive from the contract. But A does not sue for breach
of contract. He can't; the parol evidence rule would bar a claim that prom-
ises made during the negotiations but not repeated in the contract should be
deemed contractually binding. So A sues B in tort, charging fraud. The parol
evidence rule is not a rule of tort law. But B has a defense: the written con-
tract had included a clause stating that neither party was relying on any
representations not embodied in the written contract. The "no reliance"
clause scotches A's fraud suit because you cannot obtain damages for fraud
unless you relied on the fraudulent representations, and A has disclaimed
such reliance. So although B is assumed to have acted wrongfully, A has no
remedy either in contract or in tort.
Is that a bad result? I think not. Provided (as was true in my case) that A
is competently represented in the contract negotiations, so that he under-
stands the meaning and significance of such a clause, he gave away his right
to sue for fraud, with his eyes open, and presumably was compensated in
other terms of the contract for making this concession. (Maybe he wanted
the no-reliance clause too, because he was worried that B might sue him for
fraud.)
Neither am I suggesting that moral language never appears in contract
cases. Obviously it does, as in the duty of "good faith" in the performance
of a contract. But as Holmes explained in The Path of the Law, the fact that
the law uses moral language doesn't mean that legal duties are moral duties.
He famously wished to hold law and morality sharply separate. 8 The law
uses moral language mainly because it supplies a familiar vocabulary in
which to discuss duties and entitlements and thus provides continuity be-
tween legal language and the language of everyday life. To take it literally is
a common source of mistakes in legal thinking. Holmes gave examples; here
is one that I have heard (albeit at secondhand). A class in an introductory
course on contract law was asked why consideration is important in contract
law. A student answered that it is because we want the parties to contracts to
be considerate of each other's needs and objectives. Admittedly it was a
contract course in a business school rather than a law school. But law stu-
dents and even sophisticated lawyers can stumble over the law's borrowings
from moral language to describe legal obligations.29
The idea of "good faith" is an example. We generally want people to be
honest and aboveboard in their dealings with others. But there is no general
duty of good faith in contract law. If you offer a low price for some good to
its owner, you are not obliged to tell him that you think the good is
27. Extra Equipamentos e Exportaqdo Ltda. v. Case Corp., 541 F.3d 719, 722-26 (7th Cir.
2008).
28. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, supra note 1, at 459.
29. See Mkt. St. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1991).
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underpriced-that he does not realize its market value and you do.3° You are
not required to be an altruist, to be candid, to be a good guy. You are permit-
ted to profit from asymmetry of information. If you could not do that, the
incentive to discover information about true values would be blunted. It is
an example of the traditional economic paradox that private vice can be pub-
lic virtue.
And if through no fault of his own the other party to a contract with you
cannot perform his duties under the contract, you are not obliged to forbear
to enforce your contract rights, even if the result of your hardheartedness is
to force him into bankruptcy. You may want to forbear, in your self-interest,
because creditors don't usually do well in bankruptcy. But if forbearance
were required by the law, interest rates would be higher because creditors'
rights would be diminished.
There is a legally enforceable contract duty of "good faith," but it is just
a duty to avoid exploiting the temporary monopoly position that a contract-
ing party will sometimes obtain during the course of performance. More
often than not the parties to a contract do not perform their contractual du-
ties simultaneously, and so one party may unavoidably deliver himself into
the power of the other party for a time during the performance of the con-
tract. A may agree to build a swimming pool for B, and B may agree to pay
A upon completion. Suppose that when A has finished, B refuses to pay the
agreed-upon price because he knows that A is desperately short of cash and
will agree to a reduction in the contract price, having no possible source of
cash other than B. A's cash shortage, coupled with his having completed
performance before B has begun and his having no alternative source of
cash, gives B a monopoly position as A's financier; monopoly is inefficient
and so a modification of the contract to lower its price will not be enforced.
I am not using "monopoly" in the sense in which it is used in antitrust
law. In my example, the breach is unlikely to have any effect on the market
price of swimming pools. But it produces a social loss that can be rectified
without an antitrust proceeding, just by refusing to enforce a modification of
the contract. So think of the Alaska Packers case.3' Seamen hired for the
short Alaska salmon fishing season refused to work unless their pay was
increased. The company reluctantly agreed. It had no alternative source of
labor to which it could turn; its employees had effectively monopolized its
labor supply. (A strike-which is what the case involved-is the exploita-
tion of a temporary labor monopoly.) The court refused to enforce the
contract modification, reflecting as it did the seamen's temporary labor mo-
nopoly. Courts might describe the seller's conduct in such a case as
coercive, extortionate, or in bad faith, but all they would mean by these
highly charged words (more precisely all that, for the sake of clarity in law,
they should be assumed to mean) would be that an implicit term of every
contract (unless disclaimed) is that neither party shall take advantage of a
temporary monopoly, conferred by the contract, of the supply of a key input
30. Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817).
31. Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902).
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into the output of the other party. One can if one wants denounce the tempo-
rary monopolist's conduct as wrongful, but the adjective adds nothing to the
analysis.
Another example, this one involving the buyer's conduct rather than the
seller's, is the rule that reads a "best efforts" obligation on the part of a
dealer into the dealership contract if his supplier has given him an exclusive
right to sell the supplier's product. Exclusivity gives the dealer a monopoly
during the life of the contract, and the best-efforts obligation prevents him
from exploiting it. (The benefit of the monopoly to the supplier is that it
gives the dealer an incentive to promote the supplier's product; the dealer
doesn't have to worry about free riding by competing dealers in that prod-
uct.) Nothing is gained by describing the dealer who in the absence of a
best-efforts duty would exploit the monopoly conferred by the exclusive
contract as "blameworthy.
'3 2
The duty of the victim of a breach of contract to mitigate his damages is
also explicable in monopoly terms. A breach creates a bilateral monopoly:
the parties would prefer to settle the victim's legal claim rather than litigate
over it, but they can do so only by transacting with each other. The victim
would like the damages that he has not yet incurred to mount up because
that will increase the other party's maximum settlement offer. Suppose the
contract entitles him to a million widgets, and the breach occurs after only a
hundred thousand have been delivered and he could obtain the rest from
another supplier cheaply but the cost to his original supplier of completing
performance would be astronomical." The duty to mitigate damages pre-
vents the buyer from exploiting his temporary, contract-conferred monopoly
in order to obtain a more generous settlement of his claim of breach of con-
tract.
In all these examples the duty of "good faith" arises after the contract
has been formed; that is why it is properly called the duty of good faith in
performing a contract. If I may be permitted to quote again from my opinion
in the Frey case (an opinion I had forgotten before I saw the reference to it
in the article by Professors Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar in this Symposium ),
[b]efore the contract is signed, the parties confront each other with a natu-
ral wariness. Neither expects the other to be particularly forthcoming, and
therefore there is no deception when one is not. Afterwards the situation is
different. The parties are now in a cooperative relationship the costs of
32. Frey, 941 F.2d at 596 ("[T]o switch to another familiar example of the operation of the
duty of good faith-parties to a requirements contract surely do not intend that if the price of the
product covered by the contract rises, the buyer shall be free to increase his 'requirements' so that he
can take advantage of the rise in the market price over the contract price to resell the product on the
open market at a guaranteed profit. If they fail to insert an express condition to this effect, the court
will read it in, confident that the parties would have inserted the condition if they had known what
the future held." (citation omitted)).
33. The example assumes that the original supplier could not obtain the needed quantity
from the other supplier cheaply, and thus fulfill the contract at little or no increased cost.
34. Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, An Information Theory of Willful Breach, 107 Micti.
L. REV. 1479 (2009).
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which will be considerably reduced by a measure of trust. So each lowers
his guard a bit, and now silence is more apt to be deceptive.
As performance unfolds, circumstances change, often unforeseeably;
the explicit terms of the contract become progressively less apt to the gov-
ernance of the parties' relationship; and the role of implied conditions-
and with it the scope and bite of the good-faith doctine-grows."
There is, however, a limited duty of good faith at the contract-formation
stage as well. It reflects the difference between Laidlaw v. Organ, where a
knowledgeable buyer took advantage of an ignorant seller to obtain a valu-
able good at a below-market price, and a case of "unilateral mistake," in
which the mistaken party is excused (for Laidlaw v. Organ really is a case of
unilateral mistake too), discussed by Professor Eisenberg in his article in
this Symposium. 36 In the first case, allowing the knowledgeable person to
take advantage of the ignorant one has a positive social product; in the sec-
ond, as Eisenberg argues, it does not. Again I quote, as did Eisenberg, from
my opinion in Frey:
[I]t is one thing to say that you can exploit your superior knowledge of the
market-for if you cannot, you will not be able to recoup the investment
you made in obtaining that knowledge-or that you are not required to
spend money bailing out a contract partner who has gotten into trouble. It
is another thing to say that you can take deliberate advantage of an over-
sight by your contract partner concerning his rights under the contract.
Such taking advantage is not the exploitation of superior knowledge or the
avoidance of unbargained-for expense .... Like theft, it has no social
product, and also like theft it induces costly defensive expenditures, in the
form of overelaborate disclaimers or investigations into the trustworthiness
of a prospective contract partner, just as the prospect of theft induces ex-
penditures on locks. 7
The promisee's insistence on enforcing the contract with its mistake
could be described as wrongful, but (here parting with Eisenberg) I do not
see the utility of discussing it under the rubric of unconscionability or in any
other morally charged language. I prefer to say that literal interpretation of
contracts (specifically, a court's refusal to interpolate any implied terms-
implied conditions, as they are rather confusingly described) creates oppor-
tunities for parties to extract surplus that the parties would not have agreed
to had they foreseen and made provision against such behavior. It is clearer
to speak in these terms than to invoke the moral sense.
The forgiving of unilateral mistakes illustrates that even the doctrine of
unconscionability, which might seem to pose the sharpest challenge to the
35. Frey, 941 F.2d at 594-96.
36. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Role of Fault in Contract Law, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1413
(2009).
37. Frey, 941 F.2d at 594.
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no-fault theory of contract law that I am expounding, may be explicable in
nonmoral terms. A further illustration is the doctrine announced by Justice
Traynor in Monarco v. Lo Greco:3" if "either an unconscionable injury or
unjust enrichment would result from refusal to enforce" an oral promise, a
defense based on the statute of frauds will be denied.39 I wrestled with this
doctrine in a recent case,4° and concluded that the doctrine is best under-
stood as an effort to balance the value of protecting reasonable reliance
against the policy that animates the statute of frauds of forestalling contract
suits based on fraudulent or mistaken claims of an oral promise. It is not
enough that the plaintiff relied on an oral promise; the statute of frauds
would be too easily evaded if it did not apply to claims of promissory estop-
pel. Traynor's doctrine, I concluded from an examination of the cases,
provides a substitute for the evidentiary function of a writing by requiring "a
party that wants to get around the statute of frauds to prove an enhanced
promissory estoppel, and the enhancement consists of a kind or amount of
reliance unlikely to have been incurred had the plaintiff not had a good-faith
belief that he had been promised remuneration. ,4 The words "unconscion-
able" and "unjust" conceal the actual character of the doctrine.
II.
The analysis that I have presented for preserving our "no-fault" regime
of contract law is of course not conclusive, but even if it were less persua-
sive than an analysis that reached the opposite conclusion I would be
disinclined to favor changing the law. This is a general point, having nothing
in particular to do with the fault issue. It applies to any default rule of con-
tract law. Such a rule is by definition one that the parties can contract
around. If they do not do so, or at least do not do so frequently, there is an
inference (except in the case of contracts with consumers for inexpensive
items) that the rule is optimal. The reason is that the costs of contracting
around, in any but the smallest contracts (which is why I am excepting small
consumer contracts), are-or so one might think (this qualification will be
explained shortly)-small relative to the other transaction costs.
Observation of contracting-around behavior can thus provide an empiri-
cal test of the efficiency of a contractual default provision.42 Given the
38. 220 F.2d 737 (Cal. 1950).
39. Id. at 741.
40. Classic Cheesecake Co. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 546 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 2008).
41. Id. at 845. In Monarco, for example, "When the plaintiff reached 18 and wanted to leave
home and make his own way in the world, his mother and stepfather promised him that if he stayed
and worked on the family farm they would leave almost all their property (which was in joint ten-
ancy) to him. He stayed, and worked hard, receiving in exchange only room and board and spending
money. The farm prospered. But when the stepfather died 20 years later, he left his half interest in
the farm to his own grandson." Classic Cheesecake, 546 F.3d at 843.
42. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law, 24
YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1999); William H. Widen, Corporate Form and Substantive Consolidation, 75
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 237, 263-64 (2007).
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availability of this empirical test, it would be imprudent to change the law
on the basis of purely theoretical arguments unless the arguments were
compelling and hence unrebutted by responsible students of contract law.
And that is not the case with regard to the arguments for injecting fault (or
more fault) into U.S. contract law.
Granted, studies have found that rules are often not contracted around
even if they are inefficient. 3 Some of these studies attribute this result to a
psychological bias in favor of the status quo. But such a bias is rational in
the contracting process because very few contract disputes result in litiga-
tion, so that the transaction costs of negotiating a change in a standard
provision will therefore often exceed the benefits. 44 Whatever the reason for
the persistence of inefficient default rules, the phenomenon weakens the
empirical approach that I am suggesting, but it also exposes an additional
reason to go slow in pushing for changes ("reforms") in contract law. Law-
yers and their clients place substantial reliance on the rules of contract law.
Even when contracts are individually negotiated, a form contract (which
may simply be a form in a lawyer's office rather than something published
in a book of form contracts) is very often the basis for the negotiation, and
the form reflects existing law. In addition, contract negotiations and choice
of terms (including price) are heavily influenced by the lawyers' and clients'
understanding of the legal framework. Changing a common law rule creates
a period of uncertainty, as courts explore the boundaries of the rule in case-
by-case adjudication.
Another reason for proceeding cautiously along the path of contract-law
"reform" is the high degree of uniformity in contract law, not only across
the fifty American states but also across different legal systems altogether.
Although specific performance is said to be the default regime in European
contract law and fault does as I have said play a larger role in that law than
in Anglo-American contract law, the differences in outcome appear to be
small and are narrowing.45 Civil law judges exercise discretion to award
43. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On The Stickiness of Default Rules, 33
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 651 (2006); Lisa Bernstein, Comment, Social Norms and Default Rules Analy-
sis, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 59, 71-72 (1993); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and
Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998). Cf Robert E. Scott & Mitu Gulati, Sticky
Contracts (or Why Don't Law Firms Have R&D Departments?) (Nov. 8, 2008) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author).
44. This is a possible explanation for contract lawyers' tendency, noted by Scott & Gulati,
supra note 43, to swallow their objections to conventional contract terms that may not fit the cir-
cumstances of the particular contract in negotiation. In addition, just raising a question about a
familiar term may alarm the other party or be taken as a signal that the party raising the question is
not committed to the deal or seeks an unwarranted advantage.
45. See Wayne R. Barnes, Contemplating a Civil Law Paradigm for a Future International
Commercial Code, 65 LA. L. REv. 677, 751-52 (2005); Gotanda, supra note 8, at 63-64; Julian
Hermida, Convergence of Civil Law and Common Law in the Criminal Theory Realm, 13 U. MIAI
INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 163, 167-70 (2005); Barry Nicholas, Fault and Breach of Contract, in
GooD FAITH AND FAULT IN CoNTRAcT LAW, supra note 25, at 337; Patricia Pattison & Daniel
Herron, The Mountains are High and the Emperor is Far Away: Sanctity of Contract in China, 40
AM. Bus. L.J. 459, 475 (2003); cf. Wemer E Ebke & Bettina M. Steinhauer, The Doctrine of Good
Faith in German Contract Law, in GooD FAITH AND FAULT IN CoNTRAcT LAW, supra note 25, at
171, 190.
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damages rather than order specific performance, and often the same out-
comes are reached in common law and civil law systems under different
doctrinal rubrics. Thus in answer to a question by Douglas Baird at the con-
ference, Stefan Grundmann explained that civil law courts reach results
similar to Hadley v. Baxendale under the rubric of a precontractual duty to
mitigate damages by requiring the buyer to warn the seller of any unusual
damages that a breach would cause.
Global consensus (to exaggerate a bit) is further evidence--of course
not conclusive-for the optimality of our existing law. It also suggests the
importance, under modem conditions of commerce, of having a degree of
global uniformity of contract law. Because there is no international conven-
tion on contract law that would make it possible to change the whole
world's contract law at a stroke, a change in that law would have to be im-
plemented piecemeal, jurisdiction by jurisdiction; the process of attaining
global uniformity would be protracted, and that is another reason to go slow
in changing domestic contract law.
Against all this it may be argued, in the spirit of Professor Shiffrin's ar-
ticle in this Symposium,4 that it is often immoral to break a contract
deliberately and that the law should be shaped accordingly, and thus, for
example, punitive damages should be allowed in many cases of willful
breach. The other side of this coin, presumably, is that a nonperformer
should be held in breach of contract only if the breach was willful, oppor-
tunistic, or perhaps negligent, but in any event in some way wrongful. I have
no wish to debate the morality of contract breaking, but I don't understand
the "accordingly" The law does not enforce every violation of the moral
code, let alone enforce it to the hilt (as by awarding punitive damages for, or
affixing criminal sanctions to, every violation), and I doubt that Shiffrin
would want it to. Nor does the law excuse all injuries that are not the result
of a breach of the moral code. (Does she want to abolish strict liability in
tort?) She needs to give reasons why recasting contract law in moral terms
would be a sensible step to take and not merely the logical implication of a
philosophical theory.
46. Seana Shiffrin, Why Breach of Contract May Be Immoral, 107 McH. L. REv. 1551
(2009).
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